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Recent Developments
The Fairness Doctrine Redux: Media Bias and the
Rights of Broadcasters
Erik Ugland∗
Despite the ideological chasm that still divides Democrats
and Republicans, members of both parties share a common
conviction that the American mass media are biased against
them. While Republicans fulminate about “the liberal press,”
the sinister agendas of National Public Radio, and the “CBS
Evening News,” Democrats blast media consolidation, Fox
News, and the conservative talk-radio juggernaut.1 This kind
of media scapegoating is an enduring and generally harmless
feature of American democracy. But when political attacks on
the media are coupled with calls for government regulation of
media content, it becomes something more than a simple
sideshow.
Regulating media content—including news reporting—is
precisely what some members of Congress are now proposing as
a way to “restore fairness in broadcasting”2 and counteract the
“proliferation of highly partisan networks, news outlets, and
The centerpiece of their campaign,
ownership groups.”3
featured in two House bills, is the resurrection of the Fairness
Doctrine—the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
policy that from 1949 to 1987 compelled broadcasters to
© 2005 Erik Ugland.
∗
Assistant Professor, J. William and Mary Diederich College of
Communication, Marquette University. B.A., 1991, University of Minnesota;
J.D., 1995, University of Minnesota; M.A., 1999, University of Minnesota;
Ph.D., 2002, University of Minnesota.
1. See, e.g., ERIC ALTERMAN, WHAT LIBERAL MEDIA? THE TRUTH ABOUT
BIAS IN THE NEWS (2003); BERNARD GOLDBERG, BIAS: A CBS INSIDER EXPOSES
HOW THE MEDIA DISTORT THE NEWS (2003).
2. Media Ownership Reform Act, H.R. 3302, 109th Cong. § 2(b)(2) (2005).
3. Fairness and Accountability in Broadcasting Act, H.R. 501, 109th
Cong. § 2(4) (2005).
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address issues of public importance and to air competing points
of view on those issues. The Fairness and Accountability in
Broadcasting Act,4 introduced in February by Representative
Louise Slaughter, would restore the Fairness Doctrine5 as well
as the FCC’s old “ascertainment” policy,6 which required
broadcasters to elicit feedback from their communities about
the issues that they should cover.7 Another House bill, the
Media Ownership Reform Act8 proposed by Representative
Maurice Hinchey, would also reinstate the Fairness Doctrine,9
although as just one piece of a broader effort to limit the size
and influence of media conglomerates.10
Both of these bills are currently in committee, and ideally,
that is where they will stay. Although it may be tempting for
politicians to use their power to reign in perceived enemies, and
although there is a vast, bipartisan constituency of citizencritics who would applaud the government’s exercise of greater
control over the media, it is both impractical and
unconstitutional to ask government officials to serve as arbiters
of ethics in journalism.
The old Fairness Doctrine forced the FCC to serve that
role, and it was an abject policy failure, which is why the

4. Id.
5. See id. § 2 (“Each broadcast station licensee shall, consistent with the
purposes of this subsection, cover issues of importance to their local
communities in a fair manner, taking into account the diverse interests and
viewpoints in the local community.”).
6. See id. (“Each broadcast station licensee shall hold two public
hearings each year in its community of license during the term of each license
to ascertain the needs and interests of the communities they are licensed to
serve.”).
7. See Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast
Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971). The FCC freed radio broadcasters of these
requirements in 1981. See Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981). It
did the same for television broadcasters in 1984.
See Revision of
Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements,
and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 49 Fed.
Reg. 33,588 (1984).
8. H.R. 3302, 109th Cong. § 2(b)(2) (2005).
9. See id. § 3(a).
10. See id. § 4(a) (explaining that the bill would prevent a single company
from owning more than five percent of the nation’s full-power radio stations
and would also impose stronger limits on radio ownership within individual
markets). The bill would also codify many of the FCC’s existing limits on
media ownership, thereby thwarting the Commission’s recent efforts to relax
those restrictions. See id. § 5(c).
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Commission abandoned it in 1987.11 As the FCC explained, not
only did the Fairness Doctrine permit “excessive and
unnecessary intrusion into the editorial processes of broadcast
It rewarded
journalists,”12 it was also self-defeating.
broadcasters who eschewed controversial content and imperiled
the licenses of those who did not. The Fairness Doctrine was
also irregularly enforced and was occasionally abused by
politicians seeking to manipulate broadcast content.13
Those seeking to establish a new Fairness Doctrine need to
acknowledge this unpleasant record, and they need to offer a
compelling regulatory rationale to justify such a wide-ranging
usurpation of First Amendment rights.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
The first intimation of a “fairness” obligation on the part of
broadcasters did not come from the FCC, but from its
predecessor, the Federal Radio Commission (FRC). In 1929,
the FRC held that failing to address controversial issues and to
present multiple points of view would “not be fair” and “would
not be good service.”14 The policy remained somewhat formless
until 1949 when the FCC outlined more plainly the twin
obligations of broadcast licensees: (1) “to provide a reasonable
amount of time for the presentation . . . of programs devoted to
the discussion and consideration of public issues”15 (Prong
One), and (2) “to encourage and implement the broadcast of all
sides of controversial public issues”16 (Prong Two). On several
occasions the FCC reexamined and sought to clarify its

11. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987), reconsideration
denied, 3 F.C.C.R. 2035 (1988), review denied, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
12. Id. at 5052.
13. See Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of
Broadcasting Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 143, 190-194 (1985) [hereinafter 1985
Fairness Report].
14. See Great Lakes Broad. Co., 3 F.R.C. 32, 33 (1929), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1930), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930). The
Commission declared that the “public interest requires ample play for the free
and fair competition of opposing views, and . . . the principle applies not only
to addresses by political candidates but to all discussions of issues of public
importance.” Id.
15. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949).
16. Id. at 1251.
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Fairness Doctrine policy,17 but it did not relax the requirements
or question the legitimacy of their enforcement. That changed
in 1985 when the Commission engaged in a comprehensive
inquiry into the Fairness Doctrine and concluded that the
policy
was
unnecessary,
counterproductive,
and
The Commission did not
constitutionally suspect.18
immediately rescind the policy, however, because it was
unclear whether it could do so without Congressional
approval.19 A year later, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the FCC had the authority to unilaterally rescind the
Fairness Doctrine,20 which it did in its 1987 Syracuse Peace
Since then, there have been two
Council decision.21
unsuccessful attempts by Congress to reinstate the Fairness
Doctrine.22
17. See, e.g., The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine
and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1
(1974); Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial
Issues of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598 (1964).
18. See 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 13.
19. In some ways, it seemed that the Fairness Doctrine had been
transformed from an FCC policy to a federal law by Congress’s 1959
amendments to section 315 of the Communications Act. That section defines
the equal opportunity rule, stating that “[i]f any licensee shall permit any
person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a
broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such
candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station.” 47 U.S.C. §
315 (2000). Section 315 also outlines some exceptions to this general rule, and
adds that “[n]othing in [the exceptions] shall be construed as relieving
broadcasters . . . from the obligation . . . to afford reasonable opportunity for
the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance.” Id. Some
argued that this language essentially, if somewhat indirectly, codified the
Fairness Doctrine, and therefore the FCC lacked the jurisdiction to rescind it.
But see Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that this statutory language was merely an
acknowledgement of the existence of the FCC’s Fairness Doctrine policy, not a
codification of it), reh’g denied, 806 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
482 U.S. 919 (1987). This opened the door for the FCC to officially repeal the
rules.
20. See Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr., 801 F.2d at 518.
21. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987), reconsideration
denied, 3 F.C.C.R. 2035 (1988), review denied, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990). Two related provisions, the personal attack
rule, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (2000), and the political editorial rule, 47 C.F.R. §
73.1930 (2000), both avoided this FCC scrutiny and remained in effect for
another thirteen years. But see Radio Television News Dirs. Ass’n v. FCC, 229
F.3d 269 (D.C.Cir. 2000) (holding that the FCC had not provided a sufficient
evidentiary foundation to justify continued enforcement of the rules, and the
rules were therefore suspended).
22. See H.R. 315, 101st Cong. (1989); S. 742, 100th Cong. (1987).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
Content-based restraints of speech and press are subject to
strict scrutiny,23 the highest standard of constitutional review,
and are nearly always held to violate the First Amendment.24
Indeed, if the government extended the Fairness Doctrine
requirements to communicators using any other medium—
print,25 cable,26 or Internet27—they would be struck down
posthaste.
However, because radio and television broadcasters still
occupy a disfavored place in the courts’ First Amendment
jurisprudence, Fairness Doctrine supporters see no
constitutional obstacle. They are emboldened by the Supreme
Court’s 1969 decision in Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC,28 which
upheld the constitutionality of the old Fairness Doctrine. But
supporters of the new Fairness Doctrine proposals do not
acknowledge that the Court’s Red Lion framework, and indeed
the FCC’s entire regime of broadcast regulation,29 is built upon

23. The “strict scrutiny” standard requires that the government show that
the “regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
461 (1980)).
24. See Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove
all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its messages, its ideas, its subject matter or its
content.”).
25. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking
down a content-based right-of-reply statute aimed at newspapers, resulting in
substantial autonomy for the print media under the First Amendment).
26. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)
(distinguishing cable from broadcast television regulation and holding that
while content-neutral regulation of cable television should be analyzed under
the intermediate rather than the strict scrutiny standard, content-based
restrictions will still be analyzed using strict scrutiny), aff’d, 520 U.S. 180
(1997).
27. See Reno v. ACLU, 512 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down regulation of
indecent content on the Internet and providing protection for online speech
equivalent to the protections afforded the print media).
28. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
29. Examples of broadcast regulations include: broadcasters must provide
reasonable opportunities for political candidates to air advertising on their
stations; they must give equal time to political candidates if their opponents
are allowed use of that broadcast station; they must air three hours of
programming each week that is designed to serve the educational interests of
children; they must not air advertising for tobacco products; and they must not
air content that is indecent. For a general discussion of these requirements,
see MASS MEDIA BUREAU, FCC, THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING (1999),
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the “scarcity rationale”—the archaic notion that the broadcast
spectrum is a scarce resource, and should therefore be subject
to governmental regulation to ensure the public interest is
served.
The Supreme Court first endorsed spectrum scarcity as a
rationale for broadcast regulation at a time when television
viewers were fortunate to receive three or four channels of
programming.30 The broadcast landscape had not changed
significantly by the time the Court decided Red Lion in 1969.
But in the thirty-six years since then, television and radio
technology has developed dramatically.
Today’s media
marketplace bears almost no resemblance to the one the
Supreme Court justices knew in the late 1960s. Society’s
dramatic movement from media scarcity to media abundance
has eviscerated the factual predicates underlying Red Lion.
Red Lion’s force started to decay in the mid-1980s when the
FCC declared that scarcity was an untenable basis for
broadcast regulation,31 and it has continued to weaken over the
subsequent two decades.
Some proponents of broadcast regulation make a
distinction between numerical scarcity and allocational
scarcity,32 arguing that even if there are sufficient broadcast
licensees in a market to provide diverse programming, the
electromagnetic spectrum is still a finite resource, so the
government must choose who is allowed to use that resource.
Although the spectrum is finite, it certainly does not
necessitate or justify government micromanagement of private
political speech. Surely the FCC can address the technical
dilemmas posed by finite spectrum without assuming the
available
at
http://www.fcc.gov/mb/audio/decdoc/public_and_broadcasting.html.
30. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) (“The facilities of radio
are not large enough to accommodate all who wish to use them.”).
31. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987), reconsideration
denied, 3 F.C.C.R. 2035 (1988), review denied, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990). Here, the court stated:
We no longer believer that there is scarcity in the number of
broadcast outlets available to the public.
Regardless of this
conclusion, however, we fail to see how the constitutional rights of
broadcasters – and indeed the rights of the public to receive
information unencumbered by government intrusion – can depend on
the number of information outlets in particular markets.
Id. at 5054.
32. See id. (describing the difference between these two rationales and
why neither is a sufficient basis for broadcast regulation).
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editorial duties of a station manager or news director.
This is not to say that the First Amendment completely
prohibits FCC enforcement of public interest standards for
broadcasters. The FCC has a duty to ensure that spectrum
space is not wasted by delinquent licensees.33 But contentrelated judgments should only be made during the license
renewal process, and the standard should be set so high—gross
abuse—that broadcasters have the autonomy needed to make
unorthodox programming choices. For example, the FCC might
be justified in denying a renewal request from a licensee whose
programming lineup consisted of a single episode of “Leave it to
Beaver” broadcast on a continuous loop. But the same would
not be true of a broadcaster whose programming challenged the
precepts of a certain religion or addressed radical political
philosophies.
Proponents of broadcast regulation occasionally lean on a
third rationale: because broadcasters use public property, the
government has a right to attach public-service conditions to
their license.34 There is nothing unique, however, about
broadcasters’ use of public property. All mass media use public
property. Newspapers use city sidewalks and public buildings
for their news racks, and cable system operators and Internet
service providers use public rights-of-way (public land and
publicly owned telephone polls) to connect to subscribers. Some
non-broadcast media, such as satellite providers and wireless
Webcasters, even use the electromagnetic spectrum, and yet
they are free from the public-service obligations and contentbased regulatory burdens imposed upon broadcasters.
The regulatory rationales that undergird broadcasters’
second-class status are no longer viable. They are either
specious on their face or their factual foundations have
deteriorated to the point that they cannot be credibly applied.
The whole regime of restrictions to which broadcasters are
subject is ripe for a constitutional challenge. But at the very
least, the imposition of a new content-based law—even one
motivated by a good-faith desire to ensure “fairness”—cannot
be tolerated as a matter of policy and cannot stand as a matter
of First Amendment law.
33. See NBC, 319 U.S. at 216 (“The facilities of radio . . . cannot be left to
wasteful use without detriment to the public interest.”)
34. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (2000) (explaining that broadcasters are obliged
under the Communications Act of 1934 to serve the “public interest,
convenience, and necessity”).
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PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
Setting aside the Fairness Doctrine’s constitutional
imperfections, there are a number of practical problems that
supporters of the Hinchey and Slaughter bills will also have to
confront. It should be made clear that neither of the two bills
before Congress represents a reconceptualization of the old
Fairness Doctrine. No attempt is made to modify its purposes
or application. They simply call for a reactivation of the same
policy that the FCC assailed, and ultimately repealed, two
decades ago. All of the problems identified by the FCC in its
1985 Fairness Report and in its ruling in Syracuse Peace
Council would persist today.
One of the absurdities of the Fairness Doctrine is that it
allows a group of political appointees to make delicate
judgments about the fairness of news reporting. Although the
FCC is an Independent Regulatory Agency (IRA), it is by no
means nonpartisan.
Each of the five commissioners is
appointed by the President, and each identifies with a political
party. The President also determines the balance of power on
the Commission, with a three-member majority sharing the
same political party as the President. In addition, the FCC is
heavily lobbied,35 and its policies have a significant influence
on the political process.36
Giving political appointees this kind of responsibility
creates obvious risks of either unintended bias or overt abuse.
Will commissioners be influenced by their own political
affiliations and loyalties? Will party leaders pressure them to
rule a certain way on Fairness Doctrine appeals? Will quid pro
quo arrangements be made between elected officials and either
broadcasters or FCC officials? It would be easy for Fairness
Doctrine supporters to dismiss these as hypothetical concerns,
but there is a history of government intimidation of
broadcasters that cannot be overlooked.37 In the 1970s, the

35. See Bob Williams, Behind Closed Doors: Top Broadcasters Met 71
Times with FCC Officials, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, May 29, 2003,
http://www.publicintegrity.org/telecom/report.aspx?aid=83 (discussing how
FCC Chairman Michael Powell had said in a 2003 interview with CNBC that
he believed the FCC was the second most heavily lobbied federal institution
after the U.S. Congress).
36. For example, the FCC enforces the equal opportunity rule and the
equal time rule of the Communications Act, which political candidates depend
upon to reach voters with their messages. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2000).
37. See RICHARD E. LABUNSKI, THE FIRST AMENDMENT UNDER SIEGE:
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Nixon Administration, often at the direction of Nixon himself,38
sought to tame broadcasters by threatening nonrenewal of
licenses or the imposition of sanctions by the Securities and
Exchange Commission39 or the Justice Department.40
Additionally, the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations
organized campaigns to flood broadcasters with complaints and
demands for free air time in an attempt to force broadcasters to
abandon their more right-wing programming.41 There are
scores of other examples of this kind of pressure being put on
broadcasters, who have always been more vulnerable to outside
influence than their print counterparts.42
Even without evidence of actual abuse, risks are still
present. As the FCC noted in its 1985 Fairness Report: “[T]he
fairness doctrine provides governmental officials with the
dangerous opportunity to abuse their position of power in an
attempt either to stifle opinion with which they disagree or to
coerce broadcasters to favor particular viewpoints which
further partisan political objectives.”43 Because these dangers
are not merely conceptual, because they implicate core First
Amendment principles, and because they threaten the integrity
of both journalism and the political process, it would be foolish
to simply trust this matter to the good will of the FCC,
particularly in today’s divisive political environment.
Supporters of the Hinchey and Slaughter bills clearly put a
lot of trust in the FCC’s ability to be fair and to resist outside
THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 134-37 (1981).
38. See David L. Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications
Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213, 247-51 (quoting an Oct. 17, 1969, memo for H.R.
Haldeman from J.S. Magruder in which Magruder describes twenty-one
instances in a thirty-day period in which President Nixon directed his staff to
take action in response to unfair news coverage).
39. See LABUNSKI, supra note 37, at 135 (quoting White House Special
Counsel Charles Colson as saying to CBS Vice-Chairman Frank Stanton,
“We’ll bring you to your knees on Wall Street . . . .”).
40. See id. at 135-36 (noting that the Nixon Justice Department brought
several suits against the networks for alleged violations of antitrust laws,
most of which were “quickly dismissed” by the courts); see also Bazelon, supra
note 38, at 248 (quoting H.R. Haldeman’s proposal that the White House use
the IRS to investigate media companies and the antitrust laws to “investigate
various media,” as he believed “[e]ven the possible threat of anti-trust action . .
. would be effective in changing their views ”).
41. FRED W. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GUYS, THE BAD GUYS AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 40-42 (1976).
42. See generally LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT (1987).
43. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 13, at 192.
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influence, but their biggest leap of faith is in believing that a
new Fairness Doctrine will actually solve, or in any way
alleviate, the problem of media bias. Experience with the old
Fairness Doctrine suggests otherwise.
The old Fairness Doctrine did not enhance either the
amount or the substantive balance of broadcast programming
on public-affairs issues, and in many cases it encouraged
broadcasters to avoid such content.44 In 1985, the FCC
presented statements from dozens of broadcasters who
concluded that the best way to elude an FCC enforcement
proceeding was to simply abandon controversial content
altogether.45 Because the FCC did not take any action against
a broadcaster unless a member of the audience complained, and
because most people were only motivated to complain when
they perceived a violation of Prong Two (when a station fails to
present all sides of controversial issues), the result was that
broadcasters sanitized rather than expanded their content.
The old Fairness Doctrine, then, was not merely unhelpful; it
exacerbated the problems it was created to solve.
Those problems would be writ large today. Over the past
few years, broadcasters have become accustomed to censoring
themselves in the wake of the FCC’s confused crackdown on
indecency,46 and they have edited or jettisoned scores of
programs fearing that they might provoke FCC forfeiture
proceedings.
ABC, for example, which has traditionally
commemorated Veterans Day by airing an unedited version of
the film “Saving Private Ryan,” abandoned that practice in

44. See Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, Was the Fairness Doctrine a
“Chilling Effect”? Evidence from the Postregulation Radio Market, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 279, 295-99 (1997) (noting that the amount of informational
programming in radio increased substantially in the years following the
Fairness Doctrine’s repeal, suggesting that the Fairness Doctrine had created
a disincentive to produce such programming and that, once freed of those
limitations, broadcast station owners would begin increasing that type of
content).
45. See 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 13, at 169-88.
46. Recently the FCC has imposed significant fines against broadcasters
in several high-profile cases. It entered into a consent decree with Viacom for
$3.5 million as punishment for the CBS Super Bowl halftime show in which
Janet Jackson’s breast was exposed. It also entered into a consent decree with
Clear Channel for $1.75 million to settle several outstanding Notices of
Apparent Liability (NALs). And it has fined several other broadcasters as a
result of indecent speech by media celebrities such as rock star Bono and
shock
jock
Howard
Stern.
See
FCC,
FCC
Actions,
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/Actions.html (last updated Oct. 13, 2005).
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2005 because it worried that the film’s profanity might trigger
FCC punishment.47 For similar reasons, PBS substantially
edited its program, “A Company of Soldiers,” about the lives of
troops in Iraq.48 These are just a couple of examples of the kind
of collateral damage that a regime of content-based
intervention can produce.
As reluctant as broadcasters are to cross the line on
indecency, they would likely be even more inhibited by
punishments targeting political content. Even in the absence of
Fairness Doctrine penalties, broadcasters have shown an
increasing wariness of programs and advertisements that could
potentially antagonize half of the audience. In 2004, for
example, CBS rejected an ad from MoveOn.org to be run during
the Super Bowl that criticized the Bush Administration’s tax
cuts,49 several ABC affiliates refused to air an episode of
“Nightline” in which anchor Ted Koppel read the names of
American troops killed in Afghanistan and Iraq,50 and both
NBC and CBS, along with many of their affiliates, rejected an
ad from the United Church of Christ that contained a splitsecond image of two men holding hands.51 More recently,
several broadcasters refused to air an ad from famed antiwar
protester Cindy Sheehan in which she urged President Bush to
withdraw troops from Iraq.52
Adding a new layer of FCC punishments would only
encourage more editorial timidity. Although on its face Prong

47. See Lisa deMoraes, “Saving Private Ryan:” A New Casualty of the
Indecency War, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2004, at C1, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A41464-2004Nov10.html.
48. See PBS, Frontline: A Company of Soldiers—Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/company/faqs/ (last
updated Feb. 22, 2005) (explaining that although Frontline edited the
program, it nevertheless believed that some of the strong language kept in the
piece “was an integral part of our journalistic mission: to give viewers a
realistic portrait of our soldiers at war”).
49. See Timothy Karr, CBS Cuts MoveOn, Allows White House Ads
Jan.
16,
2004,
During
Super
Bowl,
MEDIACHANNEL.ORG,
http://www.mediachannel.org/views/dissector/affalert131.shtml.
50. See McCain Rebukes Sinclair ‘Nightline’ Decision, CNN.COM, April 30,
2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/SHOWBIZ/TV/04/29/abc.nightline/.
51. See Lynn Neary, Some TV Networks Refuse to Run Church Ad,
Dec.
2,
2004,
NPR.ORG,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyID=4197277.
52. See Bill Wallace, Sheehan’s Anti-War Message Follows Bush Trail: 60Second Ad Airs on Stations in Idaho, Utah, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 27, 2005, at
A10.

UGLAND_FINAL_189.DOC

312

01/09/2006 12:46:24 PM

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 7:1

One—the “reasonable time” provision—might seem like a
potential antidote to this problem, in practice it would be
extremely difficult for a complainant or the FCC to make the
case that a broadcast station’s programming is so devoid of
public-affairs content that it should be fined or have its license
revoked. In fact, under the old Fairness Doctrine, only one
broadcaster was ever punished under Prong One.53 The FCC
would also be hard-pressed to establish sensible criteria for
determining how much public-affairs programming is
sufficient.
An even greater challenge would be identifying standards
for assessing the “fairness” of programming. Would local
newscasts be targeted for not presenting the viewpoints of
foreign critics of the war in Iraq?
Would broadcasters
televising presidential press conferences be expected to provide
response time to representatives of other parties? Would NBC
affiliates be vulnerable for airing weekly episodes of “Will and
Grace” without giving anti-gay bigots or Christian
fundamentalists an opportunity to present their points of view
about homosexuality? These are not merely practical concerns;
they have a constitutional dimension as well. If the Fairness
Doctrine requirements are so vague that broadcasters do not
know how to stay within the bounds of the law, it violates their
right to due process under the Fifth Amendment.54
Another problem for broadcasters would be determining
which viewpoints merit their attention.
Because it is
impossible to air “all sides” of public issues, as is technically
required by Prong Two, it is inevitable that broadcasters would
seek to comply by clumsily matching liberal content with
conservative content, pro-choice speech with pro-life speech,
and so on. The complexities of being truly inclusive would be
abandoned in favor of a perfunctory presentation of the most
simple and accessible dichotomies. The Fairness Doctrine
would reinforce the one-dimensional, red-blue template that
has infected our political discourse, it would stamp out nuance,

53. See Mink, 59 F.C.C.2d 987 (1976) (holding that a West Virginia radio
station violated Prong One by refusing to air a congresswoman’s taped
commentary on the hazards of strip-mining during a period when Congress
was considering legislation on that practice).
54. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (stating that the
vagueness of a law limiting online indecency was problematic as both a matter
of First Amendment free press law and as a matter of Fifth Amendment due
process law).
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and it would give excessive weight to certain points of view by
dividing every issue into equal halves. One can imagine
broadcasters diligently devoting equal time to pro and con
perspectives on issues like global warming and evolution, even
though most scientists believe in global warming and nearly
every scientist subscribes to the theory of evolution.55 Although
the Fairness Doctrine seems to recognize that some points of
view are not worthy of equal attention, in practice it would be
hard for broadcasters to resist this kind of feckless neutrality.
CONCLUSION
Whether the supporters of the Hinchey and Slaughter bills
ultimately prevail, they have at least chosen an opportune time
to advance their cause. With swelling public antipathy toward
journalists and with forty-two percent of the public saying that
the news media have “too much freedom,”56 the conditions are
ideal for Congressional action. This is a clear instance,
however, where Congress must not slavishly march to the
drumbeat of popular opinion and must instead protect the First
and Fifth Amendment rights of broadcasters, while at the same
time shielding the FCC from unnecessary administrative
burdens.
The constitutional and logistical issues raised by
resurrecting the Fairness Doctrine are so abundant, and the
potential gain—even in the most optimistic scenario—is so
miniscule, that Congress should follow the FCC’s lead,
recognize that it is both unconstitutional and impractical to
legislatively direct the editorial choices of broadcasters, and let
the Fairness Doctrine rest in peace.

55. See, e.g., Mike Fancher, Finding Agreement About Global Warming,
SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2002549334_fancher09.html;
Stephen Jay Gould, Evolution as Fact and Theory, in HEN’S TEETH AND
HORSE’S TOES 254 (1994), available at
http://www.stephenjaygould.org/library/gould_fact-and-theory.html.
56. See FIRST AMENDMENT CTR., STATE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
REPORT 24 (2004).

